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4Summary
In the mid-1980s, the OECD invented an economic classification that has had a
spectacular career - the concept of high-technology, medium-technology and low-
technology industries. This taxonomy was based primarily on the R&D intensity of
industries, meaning the ratio of R&D expenditure to output. Industries with an
R&D/Turnover ratio of more than four percent were classified as high-tech. Those
between one and four percent were medium-tech, and those less than one percent
were low-tech. This schema has become widely used in business, in policy
discussions and in economic analysis. It links with other classifications that seek to
differentiate ‘science-based’ or ‘knowledge intensive’ industries from more prosaic
activities.
This paper addresses a central problem for economic analysis and public policy in
Europe. Should Europe focus on so-called high-technology or science-based
industries in attempting to solve growth and employment problems? Or should it look
to the growth prospects within the industries on which the European economy is
actually based: low-technology and medium-technology industries (which we call
‘LMT industries’) in manufacturing and services? These questions are the focus of a
European Commission research project called PILOT – ‘Policy and Innovation in
Low-Tech’ (see www.pilot-project.org). This paper is a first output from the project – it
addresses key issues in understanding LMT industries, mainly in terms of knowledge
intensity and use.
There are many who argue that high-technology industries are the bearers of the
new knowledge economy. They argue that Europe should focus on knowledge
intensive activities in such frontier areas as ICT, biotechnology and professional
services. A related claim is that mature, traditional or LMT industries are likely to
move to less developed countries.
We claim that these perspectives are seriously mistaken. Taken together, LMT
activities account for somewhere in the region of 97% of all economic activity in
Europe. All European economies are trade-specialized in LMT products. All LMT
industries are innovative – they generate significant proportions of their sales from
new and technological changed products. Many LMT industries and products are
surviving and growing on the basis of technological upgrading, high-grade design
skills and the intensive application of knowledge to innovation. They have unique
forms of industrial organisation and knowledge creation, complex links to science
and technology knowledge infrastructures, and important regional dimensions.
Here we focuses on the creation and use of knowledge in LMT industries. We claim
that in the future the European economy, especially in the context of enlargement,
will continue to rest on LMT activities. This implies that growth, competitiveness,
cohesion and employment in Europe will depend on the performance of LMT
industries. At the present time, the knowledge-creation problems faced by such
sectors are neglected in policy arenas – but this will become a major challenge for
EU innovation, technology and research policy.
5Introduction
In recent meetings in Lisbon and Barcelona, EU Heads of Government adopted and
then reaffirmed the objective of making the EU the world’s most competitive
knowledge-based economy by 2010. How this objective might be reached has been
debated since then, focussing especially on an important target indicator selected to
reflect the objective, namely that the EU should achieve an R&D/GDP ratio of three
percent.
Both the objective and the indicator raise problems of interpretation. How should we
understand the knowledge economy, and how can its performance be measured? Is
R&D the only or best indicator of knowledge creation, and if not, what are the
implications for the innovation potential of European industry? This paper argues that
such questions have often attracted simplistic answers – we suggest that the
knowledge economy has been too often identified with high-tech, high-R&D
industries. These industries are small and unrepresentative of the European
economic structure. Concentrating on them obscures important processes of
knowledge creation and innovation in the modern European economies. In this paper
we argue that low and medium technology (LMT) industries are of great and
continuing economic importance in advanced economies. We focus on how they
create and use knowledge, arguing that LMT industries intensively create and deploy
many forms of production-relevant knowledge, including basic science results, and
that they are central to the knowledge economy.
What is the background to the policy obsession with high tech industries? In large
part it reflects the idea that ongoing societal change in modern societies can be
characterised as an emerging “Knowledge Society” (cf. Drucker, 1994; Stehr, 1994;
Willke, 1998; David and Foray, 2003) or “Learning Economy” (cf. Lundvall and
Borrás, 1997). These writers and others share the idea that modern organisations
and societies are undergoing a fundamental change process, resting on an
enhanced significance of knowledge as a productive force and asset. Continual
innovation is seen as a decisive determinant of economic and social development,
accompanied by a restructuring of work processes and organisation. In this process
6the generation, diffusion and utilisation of knowledge has become a core
characteristic of firms and economic activity as a whole. These discourses on the
emerging knowledge society describe – beyond any doubt – important tendencies of
economic and social development. We share the view that knowledge is an
increasingly important resource, but we dispute much of the conventional wisdom
about how the knowledge economy is structured, and its implications for economic
trends and hence policy measures. On the one hand, the knowledge economy is
usually identified with a very small number of research-based or science-based
activities, especially information and communications technologies (ICT), and
biotechnology. On the other hand, it is often argued that as a consequence of
increased knowledge intensity the economies of industrialised countries in Europe
and elsewhere are going through at least two great changes (Carson, 1998):
• A significant element of industrial production is moving from its traditional sites to
developing countries. The classic example is the exodus of textiles from the rich
world over the past three decades. This applies particularly to labour-intensive
‘mature’ industries: quite soon, it is argued, many big western firms in such
industries will have more employees and even customers in developing countries
than in developed ones.
• The second change is that, in many industrialised countries, the balance of
economic activity is swinging from manufacturing to services. Even in Germany
and Japan, which rebuilt so many factories after 1945, manufacturing’s general
share of jobs of the whole economy is declining very fast, in favour of high tech
manufacturing and services.
Particularly in Western countries, these alleged trends have caused a debate about
an ongoing process of “de-industrialisation” with origin in the 1970s already (cf.
Fröbel et al., 1977). By the end of the 1980s, many American and European experts
had come to believe that their countries’ industries were being “hollowed out” as
many basic activities moved to other areas (see especially Dertouzos et al., 1989). At
its most extreme, the argument was that only high technology, knowledge intensive
activities would survive in the rich countries. But all in all, we would argue, it has not
been like that. A change is happening, but it is not simply a destructive change.
7Rather the industrial sectors of many countries are reorganising themselves in a new
economic environment. The result is that many allegedly threatened mature or
traditional or low-tech industries are not only still located in their former home
countries, but they are also very competitive and successful on world markets.
It is true that the main feature of the current change process is intensified innovation
activities of many companies, based on the growing importance and utilisation of
knowledge and knowledge work. This change has important implications for
corporate strategies and behaviour (see Lazonick 2004, forthcoming, for an account
of this). To mobilise knowledge and skills, companies have to introduce and finance
specific innovation strategies. These strategies are mainly aimed at changing their
traditional organisational and personnel structures as well as their conventional
styles of utilising technologies. On the level of the corporation, organisational
integration towards innovation strategies becomes a key challenge. On the level of
work organisation, more indirect forms of co-ordination are necessary alongside the
conventional forms of hierarchical control and co-ordination. This increases the
importance of the employees’ commitment, motivation and initiative, especially in
new forms of work organisation. The participative use of information technologies,
the greater importance of organisational culture and the increased impact of inter-
organisational production networks are also central elements both in changes in
industrial organisation and structure.
However these phenomena are by no means specific to high-technology activities.
They hold true also for industrial sectors that can be termed “low-tech”, producing
mature products like furniture, clothing or light bulbs (cf. The Economist, 1998;
Maskell, 1998; Palmberg, 2001). In the public discourse on the emerging knowledge
society there is a firm belief that the high-potential and growth sectors are to be
found among the industrial sectors that are engaged in new activities, innovative
technologies and intensive research and development. The dominant view, in other
words, is that such “high-tech” industries hold the key to the future. Such industries
are identified with knowledge-intensive sectors, whereas the LMT sectors are usually
regarded as based on low levels of knowledge, without a real future in many
industrialised countries. Only the high-tech sectors offer prospects for development,
8and therefore, so the argument continues, it makes sense that economic and
science-technology policymakers should favour them.
This argument simply overlooks a key fact: that in all industrialised countries there is
a large sector of LMT industries, in manufacturing as well as in service sectors. This
holds true for the industrialised countries of Western Europe and as well as for the
transition economies of Middle and Eastern Europe with their basis of traditional and
mature industries. The empirical evidence is strong and the facts are surprising.
Between 90 and 97 percent of GDP in EU countries is accounted for by activities
which are classified as non-high tech according to OECD classification routines (cf.
OECD, 1999). Figure 1 shows the share of high-tech industries in manufacturing
value-added for the Triad from 1980 to 1996 (time period and coverage reflect data
availability, but there seem to be no significant changes if we look outside EU-9 or
examine the late 1990s). There is clearly rather little structural chagne – the share of
high tech industries in manufacturing increases between 1980 and 1984 by between
2 and 4 percentage points for each of the Triad members, after which is remains
relatively stable. We should note that these are shares of manufacturing which in
each region is less than 25% of GDP and falling throughout the period.
Figure 1
High-tech industries' share of value added for total manufacturing. 1980-1996.
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9Even before the recent industrial downturn led by the ICT industry (classified of
course as high tech) many of the fastest growing sectors in the economy were in fact
neither R&D intensive nor particularly science-based (Smith, 2003). In international
trade, most of the advanced economies are specialized in LMT industries, and this
specialization does not affect their growth performance (van Hulst and Olds, 1993).
Such sectors generate significant quantities of innovation output, in the sense of
sales of new and technologically changed products, and invest significant resources
in innovation (Smith 2001).
Let us ask a specific question about what is going on in such industries: why is it that
in the face of globalization, in which LMT industries are supposed to migrate to
developing economies, the furniture industry survives in Europe? In fact it not only
survives, it is one of the most important industries in Europe - it has 65,000 firms,
with nearly half a million employees, and an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent (which
is faster than the growth of European GNP). Over the 30-year period 1961-1990,
furniture was the second-fastest growing product group in OECD manufacturing
trade, surpassed only by computers and peripherals. This is despite a significant
increase in international competition in furniture, from Mexico, Eastern Europe and
Taiwan (Smith 2003).
To some extent, the industry has been reshaped by integration and economies of
scale, with firms like IKEA and Habitat reaching mass markets. But European
competitiveness has been based on rapid product and process innovation, and the
transformation of furniture into a flexible, design-based and knowledge-based
production system. Recent research has shown that learning in furniture rests on
local innovation systems, characterised by inter-firm collaboration, good quality
regional infrastructures, access to high-grade design resources, and highly skilled
labour forces. Complex patterns of specialization make this an innovative and
growing industry in Europe (see Lorenzen 1998 for a major detailed study).
Borrowing a concept from Kaldor (1985) we may thus argue that the stylised facts of
the EU industrial experience indicate that high tech industries are not nearly as
important for industrial and economic change as the dominant science and
technology discourse assumes. Consequently there are strong arguments for
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analysing the mechanisms behind industrial and technical change in those parts of
the economy in which these mechanisms have been ignored in recent decades.
Central among these are LMT activities – they include major activities across the
whole of the economic structure, in mining and extraction, in agriculture, in
manufacturing, and in both private and public services.
The intention of this paper is to contribute to the study of such industries by
reviewing some of the central issues involved in knowledge creation, innovation and
change in LMT sectors. So we review knowledge of conceptual and empirical issues
related to technologies and industries that are certainly out of fashion, or assumed to
disappear – or at least to disappear from industrialised countries – in ongoing
structural change driven by globalization.
This paper is not a comprehensive survey of the literature on low-tech industries.
Rather we focus on areas we collectively identify as highly relevant for further
research and for a deeper understanding of the low-tech world. The paper is
structured as follows.
• In section 1 the focus is on the background to the high-tech/low-tech classification
– the development of the high-tech race within OECD countries and the work
within the OECD related to the high-tech – low-tech dimension.
• Section 2 provides a short discussion of the role of science in industrial and
technical change - the present discussion is put into its historical and
epistemological context.
• Section 3 explores concepts of knowledge formation which we take to be a broad
concept including far more than science. Being by definition non R&D-related,
much of the knowledge formation in LMT industries must be found in those
activities which fall outside R&D statistics. Tacit knowledge is of relevance here –
but in a specific way also codified knowledge. We focus on the specificity of
knowledge in low-tech industries and the organisation of its industrial activities.
We explore the concept of ‘practical knowledge’ and the role of intelligent
organisation in mobilising the creativity of human capital in relation to LMT
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industries. We suggest that the use of codified knowledge and scientific results is
often intense but non-transparent.
• Section 4 reviews the literature on industrial districts and clusters – many LMT
activities are regionally clustered, and this section explores the reasons for and
implications of this.
• In the final section our preliminary arguments are recapitulated and the future
importance of low-tech industries is underlined.
 The appendix includes a bibliography of relevant literature, a list of institutes and
scientists conducting research on the low-tech issue as well as information about the
authors.
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1. The high-tech race
 
 The arguments for focusing on high-tech sectors are actually very old – they date
back to the end of the Second World War. For the last four decades industrial
researchers and policymakers have intensively discussed international
competitiveness in a globalised economy characterised by “international high-
technology competition” (Scherer, 1992; van Hulst and Olds, 1993). Both Americans
(cf. eg. Dertouzos et al., 1989) and Europeans (cf. eg. Servan-Schreiber, 1967;
Sharp, 1983; Freeman and Lundvall, 1988) have contributed to this topic, and
several EU-sponsored reports have focused on assessing relative world strengths in
technology (cf. eg. Archibugi and Pianta, 1992).
One of the most persistent trends in innovation policy analysis - for more than 25
years - has been the identification of ICT, high technology, and science based
industries with the ‘knowledge economy.’ In recent policy discussion it is rather
common to find arguments to the effect that the solution to perceived European
economic difficulties lies with a greater emphasis on industries that exemplify high
technology, and particular ICT output and use. For example, Fagerberg et al, in a
recent study of European growth, argue that:
… the problems that Europe faces in key areas such as growth, equality and
employment are all related to its failure to take sufficient advantage of
technological advances, particularly the ICT revolution…science-based
industries, particularly those drawing heavily on ICT, have become the main
driver of technological change and economic growth since the 1980s
(Fagerberg et al., 1999, p. 235).
The policy conclusion from this seems very clear:
…what Europe has to do is to is to take steps to embed new technologies,
especially ICTs, in society. This should bring together regulation, science and
technology policy, and employment initiatives (op. cit.).
There are many far less serious expressions of the same views, particularly in policy
arguments. In policy arenas it is common for politicians and policy-makers to simply
assert that ICT is a technology which stands alone in its impact and implications.
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 What is the historical and intellectual basis for this focus on high-tech? It may be
argued that this interest in science based industrial and technological development –
which is what the high-tech discourse is essentially about – originates in four partly
related forces:
 
• the Vannevar Bush model for science and growth;
• the long-run development of corporate capitalism
• the cold war
• perceptions of Triadic competition.
As regards the first, we consider that the Vannevar Bush (1945/1980) report to
President Roosevelt on Science – the Endless Frontier laid the ground for a new
paradigm which may be called the linear model (Stokes, 1997). The ‘linear model’ is
an ideological construct, a policy-related conception of the process of technological
change. It rests on the usually unexamined idea that the knowledge underlying
industrial production is defined by principles which are essentially scientific, that is,
principles which have in some sense been transferred from scientific research. The
process rests on a prior condition, which is an act of search and discovery - via R&D,
new scientific or technological principles are elucidated, and the innovation process is
seen as one in which the opportunities provided by this discovery are realised. The
‘translation’ process is basically sequential – from discovery, to engineering
development, to new product cereation and then to diffusion or spread.
Bush's report, which foreshadowed the establishment of the National Science
Foundation, in effect presented just such a science-based account of
competitiveness. Its fundamental claim was that:
Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates
the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn.
New products and processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on
new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed
by research in the purest realms of science. ... A nation which depends upon
others for its new basic scientific knowledge will be slow in its industrial
progress and weak in its competitive position in world trade, regardless of its
mechanical skill (Bush, 1980, p. 19).
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This kind of view about the role of science became quite widespread in documents
related to science funding issues. But it is also sometimes expressed by more or less
influential science policy-makers, either in the terms seen here, or as a more general
statement about the nature of modern technology and its dependence on a science
base. For example, Jerome Weisner, Dean of the Science School at MIT, and
Presidential Science Advisor during the Kennedy administration, suggested that:
This is the nature of modern, scientifically-based technology. The first
requirement is the existence of a body of scientific knowledge. Then the
technologist must have a thorough understanding of the underlying science to
use it as the basis for an invention in the solution of a specific problem. Also,
more likely than not, he will find that the scientists who first explored the field
that he is exploiting left large areas of ignorance which must be filled before
his task can be completed. This can only be done by further fundamental
research (Weisner, 1965, p. 33).
 
 Although it had only weak support from theory or empirical studies, this linear model
gained strong de facto support within parts of academia as well as in policy units.
This type of view is by no means a thing of the past, or something which is not
present in current policy discussions.
 
 The second force relates to the development of corporate and managerial capitalism,
which was observed already by Berle and Means (1932) and Burnham (1941) but
attracted new interest in the 1960s (cf. eg. Baran and Sweezy, 1966 and Galbraith,
1967). Alfred Chandler’s (1977; 1990) work in recent decades has been seminal.
Hand in hand with the growth of big industrial corporations, the innovation processes
underwent transformation, as did the analyses of them. This is clear in the writing of
Schumpeter which shifted its analytical focus from the “heroic entrepreneur”
(Schumpeter, 1911/34) to the R&D department of the big corporations (Schumpeter,
1943/81). The argument was that innovation simultaneously became science-based
and institutionalised in the formal R&D departments of large firms. Starting in the
German chemical industry in late 19th century this phenomenon of institutionalised
and large scale organised innovation rapidly diffused to American firms during the
first half of the 20th century (Schmookler, 1957; Freeman, 1974; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1998). Around 1960 innovations were something that had to be
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managed in the R&D units (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1959/61). Despite the fact that
many question whether it makes sense to describe either the German or America
economies from the late 19th century as “science-based” this connection between
large industrial corporate capitalism and R&D-based innovation has become an
influential background notion in our time.
 
 The third force was the intensive discussion following after the launch of the Soviet
Sputnik in 1957. What Nelson called “orbiting evidence of un American scientific
activity” caused a general panic in Western countries about the alleged neglect of
science and technology – in policy as well as in the traditional growth models (Nelson
in NBER, 1962). This led to a general increase in public-sector support in leading
OECD economies in such fields as telecommunications, aerospace, and computing.
 
 The growing rivalry between Western countries during the 60s – after two decades of
recovery from the second world war – may be looked upon as a fourth force although
it also had a clear relation to the growth of big corporations (cf. eg. Servan-Schreiber,
1967). So-called Triadic competition (Japan, Europe, USA) has since then been a
continuous focus of attention by those who believe in the high tech race (cf.
Dertouzos et al., 1989; Scherer, 1992; Heiduk and Yamamura, 1990).
 
 Together these forces created the context for the emerging interest within the OECD
(cf. OECD, 1971; OECD, 1981) and the European Union (cf. FAST, 1984; EUR,
1994) for the role of science and technology in relation to growth. It may even be
argued that this process as a whole constitutes the cultural context for the
development of innovation theory or economics of innovation (cf. eg. Freeman, 1974;
Dosi et al., 1988; Grupp, 1998).
 
 The details of the intellectual transformation taking place during these decades
would require a substantial study. It is obvious, however, that the role of science and
technology for growth and development – and thus for innovations – came more into
focus in the last four decades of the 20th century than it ever had been before. This
process may, to some extent, be the result of a real shift in the locus of knowledge
formation in industry, i.e. a “scientification or institutionalisation of technology” as
argued by several authors ( Freeman, 1974; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). It may
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also be the result in part of a shift of focus of those analysing innovative processes;
this will be analysed in the PILOT project.
 
2. On the role of science in industry and technology
2.1 The interdependence of science, technology and industry
 
 Much of the modern emphasis on high-tech industries rests on the idea of a
scientification of the innovation process. In this section we discuss some of the
background to this, in terms of the links between science and industry.
 
 The modern focus on the role of science for industrial and technical change and for
society as a whole should not obscure the fact that many scholars have approached
the topic over the years (cf. eg. Merton, 1938/70; Musson and Robinson, 1969/89;
Schmookler, 1950). Whitehead (1925), and the topic therefore has a long history.
These writers were clear in the view that the links between scientific discoveries and
the world of artefacts are far from simple.
 
 The Bush report, influenced by the success of the Manhattan project, was not so
humble in its conclusions. Not only is the concept of basic research – independent of
all practical ends – born in the report, it is also assigned the role of pacemaker of
technological progress. As we saw above, this was followed by a conclusion on the
necessity for nations to establish basic research to obtain a “competitive position in
world trade” (Bush, 1980, p. 13). A further review of the basic research concept may
lead us too far from our ambitions; but here it is enough to conclude that the linear
model which emerged out of this reasoning – although frequently questioned – has
become attractive for science and technology policy makers in many countries. The
basic science on which innovation allegedly rests has been identified as a public
good, with low appropriability, as well as non-rivalry and hence positive externalities,
and is thus well suited for publicly financed science policy (cf. Arrow, 1962).
 
 It may be argued that the linear model, as it is deployed in the Bush report, obscures
the importance of at least three classes of (partly related) problems: a) the duration
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problem; b) the independence of engineering and crafts and c) the endogeneity of
science.
 
 The duration problem is, quite simply, the fact that there is in many cases a long
period between the relevant scientific discoveries and inventions on the one hand
and successful innovations on the other. For the inkjet printer, for example, the
period between the first reported scientific results on influencing liquid droplets and a
commercial printer was as long as 200 years and certainly more than 100 years
(Laestadius, 1996). The gap between the discovery of the scientific principles of the
laser by Einstein and the first practical applications was about sixty years. Duration
periods of decades or even centuries should have implications for the use and abuse
of science policy as a means to obtain short- or medium-term industrial and
economic goals. The view within modern innovation studies is that duration problems
tend to exist because of the complexity of technological knowledge bases - far more
than scientific discovery is required for innovation. Production capability involves the
integration or articulation of many different modes of knowledge, skills, and
competences. These do not develop automatically and may well require the solution
of problems that are far more complex than an initial scientific insight.
 
 This leads us to the second problem, the status of engineering knowledge. The
problem is whether engineering should be understood as applied science or whether
it has an epistemology and procedures of its own, and is thus independent from
natural science – though subject to the same natural laws. This problem has
attracted researchers on engineering knowledge formation for decades (cf. eg.
Layton, 1976 and 1988; Vincenti, 1990; Downey and Lucena, 1995). The
independence (parallel) position is supported by results of research by Price (1965
and 1982) and by Brooks (1994) although Narin and Noma (1985) find that science
and engineering are more intertwined in the obviously science based biotechnology
field. However even in modern technological breakthroughs, like the transistor, it can
be shown that the technological paths were far from given by the achievements of
science (Gibbons and Johnston, 1982). Several decades ago Rosenberg (1969)
made the observation that technological problems solved are just a fraction of those
we are capable of handling, thus leaving technological development more or less
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undetermined by the scientific frontier and more dependent upon imbalances and
focusing processes created in the technological system itself.
 
 One conclusion, out of many, which may be drawn from the conjecture of the relative
independence of engineering, is that the influence between science and engineering
may run in both directions. This topic, here labelled as the endogeneity of science,
relates to the fact that throughout history science has developed on the shoulders of
instruments and artefacts constructed by craftsmen and engineers (Rosenberg,
1992; Stokes, 1997; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998; Jardine, 1999; Joerges and
Shinn, 2001). Technology – and its artefacts – are not created by science – on the
contrary, they often create the foundation for science, and scientists sometimes
explain how and why existing things work rather than laying the foundation for
inventing them. It is often the case that technologies or production processes
generate problems that lead to major scientific breakthroughs – Pasteur’s successful
solution to the spoilage problems of the Bordeaux wine industry, or Penzias’ and
Wilsons’s solutions to ATT’s background noise problems, each involved major
scientific breakthroughs.
 
 Questioning science-based innovation models, and the scientification of technology
more generally, leads us to a set of empirical problems. These include how
innovations in practice occur; what is the role of science, of engineering, of
craftsmanship, of design and other forms of knowledge processes, of market
reactions, and how do these practices differ between technologies and industries?
The Kline-Rosenberg (1986) highly interactive model is one way to handle that
problem of complexity, and there are others as well. The Kline-Rosenberg model in
effect sees R&D not as the foundation of innovation, but as the problem-solving
activity of last resort – it is what firms do in an innovation project when they cannot
solve problems with their existing sets of knowledge and skills. Stepping away from
the linear model thus opens up how we can think about innovation, but perhaps more
importantly it opens up how we can think about an innovating industry, and from that
leads to new territory in thinking about economic growth.
 
2.2 The OECD taxonomy
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Rather than facing the complexity described above, policy analysis has frequently
opted for a strategy of simplification. It is common to see the terms 'high-technology'
or 'knowledge intensive industries' used in a somewhat loose way, as though in fact
they are both meaningful and interchangeable terms. But we ought to remember that
the term ‘high technology’ is itself a rather recent invention, and that its meaning is
far from clear. A thorough analysis of the internal discussions on the linear model
and on the development of the science and technology paradigm that emerged
during the 1960s within the OECD falls outside the ambition of this review. However
we can note that, to create a common ground for the analyses and policy actions of
member countries the organisation began in the early 1960s to collect and publish
comparative data on science, technology and industry. The foundation for this
activity has for a long time been the Frascati Manual, the first edition of which was
published in 1963. The present sixth edition (OECD, 2002a) still serves as a
common ground for collection of data on R&D.
 
 Starting in 1986 the OECD has also, based mainly on R&D data, classified
manufacturing sectors according to R&D intensity (the percentage of total revenue
allocated to R&D) (OECD 1986). This led originally to a three-position taxonomy:
high-, medium- and low-tech industries. The OECD distinguished between industries
in terms of R&D intensities, with those (such as ICT or pharmaceuticals) spending
more than four percent of turnover being classified as high-technology, those
spending between one and four percent of turnover (such as vehicles or chemicals)
being classified as medium-tech, and those spending less than one percent (such as
textiles or food) as „low-tech“. A great problem for proponents of this classification is
that the high-tech sectors are very small, and this led to the replacement of the three-
position model by a four-position model (OECD, 1994):
 
 high-tech industries R&D/Turnover >  5%
 medium high-tech industries 5% >R&D/Turnover > 3%
 medium low-tech industries 3% >R&D/Turnover > 0.9%
low-tech industries 0.9% > R&D/Turnover > 0%  
In fact the original OECD discussion of this classification was rather careful, and
offered many qualifications. Chief among these is that direct R&D is but one indicator
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of knowledge content. Unfortunately such qualifications were forgotten in practice,
and this classification has taken on a life of its own. It is now widely used, both in
policy circles and in the press, as a basis for talking about knowledge-intensive as
opposed to traditional or non-knowledge-intensive industries. Many countries, and
also the EU as a whole, have turned the aggregate R&D/GDP ratio into a quantitative
target for science and technology policy as a whole. This is open to two important
objections. First, R&D is by no means the only measure of knowledge-creating
activities. Second, it ignores the fact that the knowledge that is relevant to an
industry may be distributed across many sectors or agents: thus a low-R&D industry
may well be a major user of knowledge generated elsewhere. Each of these issued
will be discussed in later sections of this paper.
However, it is not clear that this classification helps us, even in a limited analysis of
trends. One major problem is that in fact the high-tech sector – as we have noted - is
small, and there are therefore real difficulties in arguing that it can possibly drive the
growth process. In the OECD, for example, the USA has the largest share of high-
tech in manufacturing, but this is only 15.8% of manufacturing output, which in turn is
only 18.5% of GDP. So the high-tech sector is less than three percent of GDP. It is
hard to see how the combined direct and indirect impacts of such a small component
of output could really be a ‘driver’ of overall economic growth. Could it be that this
sector is growing rapidly? Yes it has been growing, but so have other sectors,
especially outside manufacturing. In virtually all of the OECD economies the share of
high-tech in total manufacturing has risen in the longer term, and this is widely used
as an argument for the claim that such industries are central to growth. However this
is complicated by the fact that the share of manufacturing in total output has been in
long-term decline. So between 1980 and 1995, for example, the high-tech share of
US manufacturing increased from 10.5% to 15.8%, while the share of manufacturing
in GNP decreased from 21.6% to 18.5%. What this actually implies is that the share
of high-tech manufacturing in total GNP rose over fifteen years by well under one
percentage point.1 Despite this, it is not uncommon to see quite sweeping claims
made for the high-tech sector, which are not supported by readily available evidence.
For example, OECD’s Knowledge Based Economy claims that ‘Output and
                                                
1 All of the data here is drawn from OECD (1997a).
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employment are expanding fastest in high-technology industries, such as computers,
electronics and aerospace’. But the OECD’s own ‘Scoreboard of Indicators’ actually
shows long-term negative growth rates of employment in high-tech manufacturing in
eleven of fifteen OECD countries for which data are presented (including the USA,
where high-tech employment declined at a faster rate than manufacturing
employment generally) (OECD, 1997a, p. 9).
 
 These are essentially first-level problems with any R&D-based classification. To go
any further necessitates a more precise analysis of concepts such as science,
research (basic as well as applied), development (as D in R&D), invention,
innovation etc. As noticed by Rosenberg (1992) and Mowery and Rosenberg (1998)
most of the activities in corporate R&D units do not qualify as science as normally
defined. This opens up the taxonomy problem which is one of the core questions in
the PILOT project and to which we will return in later analyses.
 
 It should be noted however that several of the shortcomings of the present indicators
in capturing important aspects of industrial and technical change have been
discussed among researchers and policy units during and since the 1990s (cf.
Hatzichronoglou, 1997; Kleinknecht and Bain, 1993; OECD, 2002, Smith 2001). This
has been an important impulse in the development of direct measures of innovation
inputs and outputs, especially focusing on non-R&D inputs, and on new product
innovations that can and do occur outside science-based industries.
 
3. Knowledge formation in industry and technology
3.1 Deficits of knowledge concepts
 
 The high-technology perspective is attractively simple for nations and communities
that wish to develop knowledge-based economies. An example is a report of the Irish
Science Technology and Innovation Advisory Council (1995): Even though the report
– Making Knowledge Work for Us – espouses the national system of innovation as a
basis for the development of policy, its main focus is on science and advanced
technology, to be achieved through increasing R&D. Another example is the annual
report of the German Ministry for Education and Research with its exclusive focus on
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the developmental perspectives of knowledge intensive economic sectors (cf. BMBF,
2002). That in itself motivates a more thorough discussion of the high-tech/low-tech
concept and its analytical foundation.
 
 Firstly, the indicators of knowledge intensity (i.e. R&D intensity) that are typically
used are not robust, in the sense of being consistent across industries and
technologies. There is strong variation in the extent to which industries and
technologies use R&D to create knowledge. On the one hand knowledge formation is
organised differently across technologies and industries – we suggest that whether
science (or “research”) related activities are more efficient or more growth inducing
than other forms of knowledge is an empirical question and should not be postulated
a priori. On the other hand there are differences in how industries identify their
activities in relation to R&D – it is important to note that R&D statistics focus on the
direct R&D expenditure of a firm (whether the expenditure leads to research carried
out internally or externally). Non-R&D performing firms may nevertheless be
participating in R&D via collective organisations or other indirect forms (such as
monitoring university R&D results). As a result, S&T indicators may show a strong
variation over industries and technologies as regards the real knowledge intensity as
well as its character in a general sense. This issue of data validity also has
implications for a correct understanding of industries’ and technologies’ growth
prospects (cf. Laestadius, 1996, 1999; Palmberg, 2001).
 
Secondly, several successful design oriented firms belong to industries classified as
low-tech. The “design” concept is vague – as is the concept “innovation” – and may
be in need of a taxonomy of its own. For the moment design is not necessarily
classified within the “D” in “R&D” according to the Frascati Manuals but there are
reasons to believe that a taxonomy starting with design may catch other activities
(and still exclude others) in comparison with the activities included in the present
formulae. From a practical point of view, the definitions of R&D in the OECD's
Frascati Manual, which structure R&D data collection in OECD economies, exclude a
wide range of activities that involve the creation or use of new knowledge in
innovation.2 The OECD’s Oslo Manual explicitly includes design activity and the
                                                
2 The development definition, on any reasonable interpretation, should include more or less all
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surveys based on it collect data on design expenditures. Expenditure on design turns
out to be an important predictor of innovation performance at firm level.
 
IKEA, Benetton and H&M are good illustrations of the importance of design. IKEA –
belonging to the very low-tech end of OECD classification of industries – has created
a capability in design (for manufacturing and for use) and logistics. Benetton and
H&M also combine design, marketing and logistics in new forms within the
framework of “mature” industries.3 This innovativeness outside the realm of the S&T
paradigm may be illustrated by a recent “airport best-seller” by Kelley and Littman
(2001). Although not scholarly, this book invites the reader to a world dominated by
creativity and high competence among highly educated innovators in a Silicon Valley
based design firm. Most of their design solutions are far from the S&T frontier, yet in
fact they are useful, profitable – and low-tech.
 
 Thirdly, the character of the specific knowledge created in several of low-tech
industries, and its relevance for innovative capabilities has not been given the
attention it deserves. This is important for companies, regions and indeed entire
economies. Significant parts of that knowledge may be characterised as
predominantly “practical” or “application-oriented”, distinct from “theoretical” or
“scientific” knowledge, and resembling what Michael Polanyi (1966) has termed
“implicit knowledge” in contrast to “explicit knowledge”. It may be also argued that the
very essence of engineering activity is design oriented. Design can be understood as
an intention to create artefacts or technical solutions rather than understanding, and
is therefore not part of R&D. We might argue that design and engineering
                                                                                                                                                        
activities related to innovation. However the Frascati Manual contains a substantial list of exclusions.
The most important of these are summarised in Chapter 2.3 and summarised in Table 2.3, which gives
guidance on how to divide R&D from non-R&D. Prototypes are basically included in R&D. Both
pilot plants and industrial design are only included if 'the primary purpose is R&D'. We would argue
that very little pilot or design activity is aimed at R&D, and therefore that most of these central
innovation activities are excluded. All improvements in production processes are excluded from
R&D. On the other hand, trial production is included 'if it implies full scale testing and subsequent
further design and engineering'. Trouble shooting, patent and licence work, market research, testing,
data collection and development related to compliance with standards and regulations are all
excluded. Obviously there are difficult boundary prblems for defining R&D. But an important point
arising from this is that many innovation-related activities in LMT industries asre likely to be
excluded from measured R&D (OECD 2002a, pp.34-50).
3 Indeed, it could be argued that much of the clothing industry, and certainly the designer
clothing sector, is based entirely on innovative design.
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development are focused on the specificity rather than the general (cf. eg. Vincenti,
1990 and Petroski, 1996), but this does not make these activities less technologically
or economically significant. The complexity of knowledge formation in technology
and industry is thoroughly analysed by Wendy Faulkner (1994; cf. also Faulkner and
Senker, 1995) who also provides a typology of knowledge used in innovation, where
(experimental) R&D is just one family of knowledge among others (Faulkner, 1994,
p. 447). One conclusion that may be drawn from the work of Faulkner is that analysis
of knowledge formation in industry and technology has to start in direct empirical
research capturing the variety across different realms of technology rather than in
indirect collection of R&D data.
 
 Fourthly, a recent study on the dynamics and characteristics of firms’ relations to
external repositories of knowledge (Hales, 2001), demonstrates that a distinction
between knowledge as furnished by external repositories or ‘knowledge bases’ and
the productive competence underpinning firm-level innovation and behaviour is
essential for understanding the ‘learning processes’ of innovating firms. Rather than
‘knowledge intensity’, this implies that the relevant driver is ‘competence intensity’.
Although formulated somewhat differently this perspective is present in several
discourses on knowledge formation and creation of firm capabilities. Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) for example use the concept “absorptive capacity” and Teece et al.
(1997) and Zollo and Winter (2002) use “dynamic capability” to address these issues.
The competences and capacities are not necessarily R&D-based, and may involve
many non-technological dimensions.
 
 Case studies on competence intensity – facing similar problems of measurement
and taxonomy – reveal that the intersection of knowledge intensive and competence
intensive industries is far from total. This is still more obvious if the analysis is
extended outside the manufacturing sector. For example, even with very
conservative criteria normal hospitals show low knowledge intensity (R&D is done
elsewhere) and high competence intensity including a very high skilled staff. In the
extension of this family of arguments we face the complexity of knowledge formation
in networks, in supply chains and in qualified purchasing relations. The dynamics
and synergies within these structures and collaborative relations are far from easy to
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capture and locate to specific actors/industries when using traditional S&T indicators
(cf. Coombs et al., 1996; Laestadius, 1996).
 
 Finally, we might question the validity of any knowledge indicators or knowledge
analysis that are not sensitive to context conditions. Can we adequately analyse the
specific features of innovation and production processes through a more or less
isolated approach to “knowledge” or should knowledge be related to its context? Our
view is that knowledge formation is highly context specific.4 This means that if we
seek to reveal the specific type and form of knowledge and its relevance to
technology and industry, we must focus on its connection with the action and work
context in each case. Such studies have been done on the level of laboratories and
breakthroughs of new technological solutions (cf. Latour, 1987). With respect to
“traditional” manufacturing, the work by Böhle et al. (1992) should be mentioned. It
demonstrates the relevance of the informal side of work organisation and
experience-based knowledge to the efficiency of highly standardised and automated
production processes. As for the investigation of the seemingly low knowledge-
intensive, low-tech work processes, one may come to the conclusion that only the
analysis of the whole production and work process makes it possible to draw
conclusions on the question whether – and if so – which forms of knowledge are
really constitutive of them.
 
 In short, there is a need to reconsider the prevailing understanding of the dynamics
of technology and industry. In other words, the black box called knowledge has to be
opened and analysed seriously across industries. In the following, some preliminary
steps will be taken in this direction focusing on three domains of core importance to
the “low-tech discourse”.
 
3.2 Codified knowledge in low-tech industries
We have argued that the most basic mistake in high-tech models is the tendency to
identify high-R&D activities with knowledge intensive industries, and hence to see
                                                
4 In this sense, knowledge is to be comprehended as a socially determined phenomenon and
should not be mixed up with pure data and information (cf. Nonaka, 1994, pp. 15; Willke, 1998, pp.
6).
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high-R&D activities as bearers of the ‘knowledge economy’. We suggest on the
contrary that LMT sectors are characterised by complex knowledge bases, involving
major engineering, design and production knowledges, and important dimensions of
practical knowledge (see section 3.4). At the same time, we argue that the focus on
direct performance of R&D in the high-tech/low-tech classification hides the fact that
most low-tech industries in fact do use research results and formal or codified
scientific knowledges in their products as well as high-tech devices in their
production systems.
The key issue in understanding the role of R&D and science in LMT knowledge
bases is to recognise that although LMT sectors use formal R&D results and codified
knowledge, often in deep and extensive ways, such knowledge use is usually non-
transparent. This is because such knowledge tends to be created via interactive
processes in other institutional locations, and to flow via mechanisms that are only
rarely captured with current indicator methods.
This refers to modern innovation theory according to which the complexity of the
array of agents within an economy, and the complexity of the interactions between
them can be regarded as a key element of innovation processes. Systems theories
of innovation in particular, which stress the interactions between knowledge-
producing agents, point to the idea that economic knowledge is a complex outcome
of such interactions. The relevant agents for knowledge production include firms, of
course, but also universities, research institutes, government labs, granting councils,
consulting companies (particularly engineering consultancies), standards-setting or
certification agencies, and in some cases (such as for open source software) user
groups. From this perspective knowledge creation and use is a socially collective
process. This means firstly that it is misleading to think of knowledge creation in
terms of simply the internal R&D performed by a firm (which is what is implied by
using R&D intensity indicators as a measure of knowledge intensity). Secondly, it is
misleading to think, as argued in some new growth theory literature, of a single
‘knowledge-producing sector’ that supplies generic knowledge to the rest of the
economy. Neither of these conceptions, although immensely popular in both
academic and policy discourses, gives us any grasp of the real problems of scientific
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knowledge creation and use in society because of their failure to incorporate
complexity or any of its implications.
From the point of view of firms, the creation and management of knowledge involves
system integration. Integration activity is partly a matter of integrating knowledge
from different sources, and partly a matter of integrating knowledge with other
production-relevant competences. The matter of practical knowledge and related
competences has already been discussed. Here we focus on the role of scientific or
other codified knowledges in LMT industries.
The main problem here lies in how to conceptualise the knowledge bases of
industries, in the context of the complexity of agents sketched above. If we think of
knowledge bases in a comprehensive way, then they should include all of the direct
and indirect knowledge inputs relevant to the output of a final product: that is, the
totality of the knowledge produced by all of the agents contributing to product
outcomes. Even a cursory examination of LMT products suggests that these
knowledge bases are complex, with many inputs of formal, codified and scientific
knowledge results. In wood products, for example, even the first cutting of a wooden
log in a sawmill might involve complex pattern recognition technologies using
algorithms aimed at the maximisation of yield. In vehicle assembly, high-grade
adhesives are normally used, and these are the outcomes of basic R&D in
chemistry. In food processing, both production and monitoring require
instrumentation technologies based on microbiology, bacteriology, and informatics.
Modern synthetic textiles are the results of decades of R&D in the chemical industry.
These simple examples can easily be deepened and multiplied, and this is an
important research task if we are to gain a full understanding of knowledge
complexity. But the general point here is that LMT sectors are not understandable via
any distinction between knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge intensive sectors.
LMT sectors are intrinsically knowledge intensive in important ways.
This is not simply a matter of passively absorbing knowledge from outside. Many of
the arguments concerning generic technologies or ‘general purpose technologies’
simply repeat the logic of the linear model of innovation, in seeing action in one
sphere generating the outcomes elsewhere. However complexity of LMT knowledge
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bases is matched by the complexity of relations among knowledge producing agents.
The incentives for the development of high grade inputs to LMT sectors are often
internal to the LMT sectors themselves – that is to say, it is performance
specifications and desired product attributes generated as aims within LMT sectors
that shape the incentives and evolution of the very high-tech sectors that are alleged
to ‘ drive’ economic growth. So not only are LMT sectors resting on complex codified
and/or scientific knowledge bases, they are generating the depth and complexity of
their knowledge bases endogenously.
 
These inter-agent or inter-industry flows conventionally take two basic forms,
‘embodied’ and ‘disembodied’. Embodied flows involve knowledge incorporated into
machinery and equipment. Disembodied flows are sometimes referred to as
‘spillovers’, but this is an excessively abstract term because it implies an automatic
process, in which recipient firms are rather passive. In fact accessing disembodied
knowledge is an active process, transmitted through scientific and technical
literature, consultancy, education systems, and movement of personnel.
The basis of embodied R&D flows is the fact that most research-intensive industries
(such as the advanced materials sector, the chemicals sector, or the ICT complex)
develop products that are used within other industries. Such products enter as
capital or intermediate inputs into the production processes of other firms and
industries: that is, as machines and equipment, or as components and materials.
When this happens, performance improvements generated in one firm or industry
show up as productivity or quality improvements in another. The point here is that
technological competition leads rather directly to the inter-industry diffusion of
technologies, and therefore to the inter-industry use of the knowledge which is
"embodied" in these technologies. The receiving industry is not necessarily just a
recipient of such technology: it may actively promote its development (specifying
technical and performance functions to producer firms, for example), and must
certainly develop the skills and competences to use these advanced knowledge-
based technologies (cf. Laestadius, 1998). Most LMT industries are major users of
such technologies, and the knowledge underlying them is part of the overall
knowledge base of LMT industries.
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As examples, consider fishing and fish farming, both of which are apparently low
technology sectors in terms of internal R&D. These are a large industries worldwide,
with aquaculture growing particularly strongly; this is moreover an important growth
sector for developing countries.  Examples of embodied flows in fishing include use
of new materials and design concepts in ships, satellite communications, global
positioning systems, safety systems, sonar technologies (linked to winch, trawl and
ship management systems), optical technologies for sorting fish, computer systems
for real-time monitoring and weighing of catches, and so on.  Within fish farming,
these high-technology inputs include pond technologies (based on advanced
materials and incorporating complex design knowledges), computer imaging and
pattern recognition technologies for monitoring (including 3D measurement systems),
nutrition technologies (often based on biotechnology and genetic research), sonars,
robotics (in feeding systems), and so on. These examples are not untypical of ‘low-
technology’ sectors – on the contrary, most such sectors can not only be
characterised by such advanced inputs, but are as we have noted arguably drivers of
change in the sectors that produce such inputs.
We can note that the underlying knowledge for fishing and fish farming mentioned
are advanced and research-based. Ship development and management relies on
fluid mechanics, hydrodynamics, cybernetic systems, and so on. Sonar systems rely
on complex acoustic research. Computer systems and the wide range of IT
applications in fisheries rest on computer architectures, and specific programming
research and development. Even fishponds rest on wave analysis, CAD/CAM design
systems, etc. Within fish-farming the fish themselves can potentially be transgenic
(resting ultimately on research in genetics and molecular biology), and feeding and
health systems have complex biotechnology and pharmaceutical inputs, and well as
foundations in studies of fish behaviour. In other words a wide range of background
knowledge, often developed in the university sector, is absorbed in the fishing and
fish farming sector.
 
 We would argue that these examples represent a general case in LMT industries,
requiring a
 fundamental reappraisal of our assessment of the relative knowledge intensity of
industries. This issue will be an explicit focus in future  PILOT studies.
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3.3 Codification and the tacit dimension
 
 One of the key elements of modern innovation theory has been also a strong
distinction between tacit and codified knowledge in production and innovation. This
leads to a temptation to argue that a distinction between high-tech and low-tech
industries can rest on the idea that high tech sectors are intensive users of codified
knowledge, while low-tech sectors are based on tacit knowledge. As already shown,
we would reject this temptation, because there is no total correspondence between
low-tech activities and tacit knowledge based activities. There is low-tech outside the
domain of tacitness as well as tacitness outside the realm of low-tech. The non-
science based character (by definition) of low-tech activities contributes however –
when analysing these activities – to a focusing on those elements of creativity,
professionalism and skills which are normally connected with tacitness.
 
 The concept itself – usually credited to Polanyi (1958/74 and 1966) – is of recent
origin within this domain of social science although it is frequently referred to today,
primarily within management theory (cf. eg. Nonaka et al., 2001). Nelson and Winter
(1982) make early and path-breaking references to Polanyi’s work. With some
exceptions, however, discourses related to industry and technology have waited until
the new millennium to adopt the tacit dimension (cf. the special issue of Industrial
and Corporate Change, 2000). The concept is hard to comprehend precisely; since it
is frequently defined in connection with the concept of explicit knowledge, and an
abundance of synonyms for it are used within the debate in the sociology of
knowledge (cf. Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001).5
 
 Based on Polanyi’s epistemological perspective, tacit knowledge can be defined as
follows (cf. Lam, 2000): Firstly, explicit knowledge can be codified, stored and
transferred whereas tacit knowledge is intuitive and unarticulated. Knowledge of this
type is action-oriented and has a personal quality that makes it difficult to formalise
or communicate. Secondly, explicit knowledge can be generated through logical
deduction and acquired by formal study. In contrast, tacit knowledge can only be
                                                
5 Eg. the discourse on artificial intelligence (cf. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986).
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acquired through practical experience in a specific context. Thirdly, explicit
knowledge can be aggregated at a single location, stored in impersonal forms and
utilised without the participation of the knowing subject. Tacit knowledge is person-
and context-bound. It has a distributive character and cannot be easily aggregated.
Polanyi’s claim was that the origin of all human knowledge is based on tacit
knowledge generated through individual intuition.
 
 The proposition on the existence of a tacit dimension is provocative and has caused
an academic discussion which by far extends beyond the intended low-tech focus of
this paper. However the debate on tacit knowledge is relevant to our work in number
of ways, mainly because it points to variations in the methods of acquiring and using
knowledge. For example, it is usually argued that tacit knowledge is acquired at work
in an inductive and explorative way - through learning-by-doing. Furthermore, it is
supposed to be composed of technical skills and segmented into more or less
established work practices, i.e. rules or routines. These work practices and rules are
not necessarily person-bound, they are rather work norms accepted collectively by
the employees or the community in question. This leads directly to the collective
dimension of knowledge, which – due to its co-operative character – must not be
ignored when analysing work processes. Collectiveness concerns knowledge which
is stored in the rules, procedures, routines and shared norms of a work process as
well as the factors which guide the problem-solving activities and patterns of
interaction among its members.6 In this sense, the collective side of knowledge is
rather to be found between than within individuals. It can be more or less than the
sum of the individuals’ knowledge, depending on the mechanisms that translate
individual into collective knowledge (cf. Lam, 2000, p. 491). The arguments by Teece
and Pisano (1998) are similar and link this to competitiveness: the ability to translate
(individual) resources to (firm) capabilities is what constitutes firms’ competitiveness.
So while we reject the idea that tacitness of knowledge is the only defining
characteristic of low-tech activities, it is clear that this concept points us towards
important problems in knowledge creation and learning.
                                                
6 In this sense, the collective dimension of knowledge refers to the phenomenon which is also
called “the collective mind“ of organizations (Weick and Roberts, 1993).
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3.4 “Practical” knowledge
 
 In order to address such problems, in the context of low-tech industries, and to avoid
some of the epistemic problems of the tacitness concept, we may use the concept
practical knowledge. Here we refer to knowledge acquired through the ongoing
process of production, developed and transmitted on the basis of learning-by-
doing/using. Such knowledge shows an individual and a collective dimension and it
has a highly informal character. Practical knowledge is often not documented or
covered completely by work instructions, operation plans and documentation rules. It
refers to the informal side of a working process often marked by accepted working
methods as well as co-operational and communication patterns, which, however, are
not to be found in any official organisation chart.7 They are accepted, carried out and
controlled by the employees involved. Such knowledge is based on collective
experience and commonly shared norms on how a working process should take an
effective and efficient course. Practitioners tend to know that this may result in clear
differences from the officially and formally planned working organisation. Such
differences are, nevertheless, absolutely essential for workability and innovation
ability.
 
 Practical knowledge can be recorded – unofficially – in personal documents and
notes. A widely known example is the operators of computer-controlled machine
tools who operate machines by means of unofficial programs which are often
unofficially modified. This modification of the programs allows a fine tuning of the
operations so that the production process might be much more efficient than if it was
run with the official programs.
 
 Practical knowledge is also marked by the fact that it cannot be clearly separated
from codified and theoretical knowledge. A number of studies on the course of
innovation processes in companies have shown that practical knowledge is always
marked by double openness. Bearers of practical knowledge often seem able to
                                                
7 In contrast to the formal side of an organization as the planned and officially defined rules
system of an organization. It is a generally known fact that the functionality of an organization is
based on the interplay of both the formal and the informal side (cf. Mayntz, 1966).
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adapt and to use knowledge acquired scientifically and systematically in order to
cope with specific work problems.8 Practical knowledge is often the precondition for
systematic work rules or engineering and technological findings, prototypes and
other products. In other words, practical knowledge is in reality closely connected
with codified knowledge. In this sense, practical knowledge shows high potential for
development with its bearers proving to be very capable of learning. Thus, the
above-mentioned modification of NC programs is based on the competent and
experience-based adaptation of a given codified knowledge in the form of the
programs developed in the programming department and the logical and syntactic
rules of a programming language. Another instructive example, described by
Laestadius (1995), is the absorption of external R&D results in a company producing
anchor cables. It concerns the adjustment of given material parameters to the actual
requirements of a forging process whose course is hard to calculate. Obviously, this
requires a high degree of practical experience in employees. A third example of this
phenomenon is work processes of engineers in construction and development
departments. These processes are based on the engineer’s skill, i.e experience and
“instinctive” feeling, enabling the application of systematically and scientifically
acquired knowledge to the relevant problem in order to find solutions (cf.
Wengenroth, 1999).
 
 However, practical knowledge can also pass into officially codified knowledge by
being recorded in technical documentation and databases. So, the content of the
foreman’s “black book” can turn into official work instructions and documentation; the
operator informs the planning department about modifications, and they are added to
the next official program for the computerised machine tools and stored in the
database for these programs. In other words, these are processes of knowledge
conversion between practical and theoretical knowledge – this appears to be
common practice in many companies. These conversion processes can be
considered as a central prerequisite for innovations, since in this way new knowledge
is created. This may also be the way for transforming disembodied knowledge into
                                                
8 This has been instructively shown by investigation results of very different social-science
disciplines such as innovation economics (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Faulkner and Senker, 1995),
sociology of technology (cf. Asdonk et al., 1991) and sociology of knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995;Willke, 1998).
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embodied (cf. Laestadius 1998). Nevertheless, these processes are not
unproblematic, as shown in particular by Nonaka (1994), and complex requirements
often have to be met.9 Nevertheless, this is a major process of knowledge creation
which is unrecorded by available indicators and much innovation analysis, yet of vital
importance for understanding the knowledge dimensions of low-tech industries.
 
 In analysing the role of LMT sectors in the knowledge economy, we can start from
the hypothesis that in industries with low R&D intensity we will find a type of
knowledge which comes very close to the outlined features of practical knowledge in
a special way. According to Laestadius (1995), this kind of knowledge proves
particularly successful for solutions to technical problems and for intelligent variations
of solutions to well-known problems, eg.:
• the ability to handle daily specific product materials such as developing and
processing specific steel alloys in order to prolong the life-cycle of, for instance,
machines used in agriculture;
• the know-how and the experience needed to guarantee the smooth running and
the improvement of complex production plants
• the mastering of processes and logistics in order to improve the processing
flexibility and the market position of a company
• the competence for a customer-specific interpretation of mature products such as
anchor chains on the basis of often incomplete information and specification, and
for adjusting it, at the same time, with flexibility to the required technical
procedures.
A characteristic feature of the production processes of significant segments of the
LMT sector is its reliance on knowledge that is on the one hand created and
reproduced through learning-by-doing as well as using, empirical trial-and-error, and
limited systematic training. On the other hand LMT firms are characterised by a
certain absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to integrate and utilise codified and
scientifically produced elements of knowledge from different, often external sources.
In other words, the LMT knowledge base is complex, deep and systemic.
                                                
9 See also in detail Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995).
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3.5 On the efficiency of intelligent low-tech organisation
The effective use of practical knowledge requires sophisticated enterprise
organisation. In relation to how low-tech companies mobilise their specific practical
knowledge, a broad spectrum of reorganisation and innovation strategies have been
identified in case studies of German companies (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000; Schmierl,
2000). They range from a far-reaching technical-organisational restructuring of the
entire production process to partial and gradual steps of reorganising certain
functions. The organisation must make it possible to continuously use the practical
knowledge available and to develop and adjust it in response to new requirements.
For low-tech companies, this often means a break with inherited “Tayloristic”
structures characterised by a strictly-defined division of labour, highly repetitive tasks
and the use of mostly semi-skilled or even unskilled workers. As shown by Schmierl
(2000) but also Hamngren et al. (1995) advanced reorganisations of industries have
led to mobilisation of creativity and knowledge which, in many cases, have
contributed to significant productivity increases and higher quality performance.
According to the literature dealing with problems of knowledge management, this
requires organisational structures enabling intensive interaction and communication
between the employees involved and, consequently, a continuous exchange of
knowledge as well as collective learning processes. Cross-functional and self-
organising teams, which show a high degree of functional redundancy and low task
specification of the employees (cf. Aoki, 1988; Nonaka, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1995;
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), are considered to be one central element of such
organisational forms. The argument is that cross-functional teams integrate and
synthesise knowledge across different areas of expertise serving as a bridge
between the individual and the organisation. Interaction, learning and knowledge
diffusion – vertically as well as horizontally – is most efficient if it takes place on team
level (Lam, 2000, p. 498). Of course, a lot of additional organisational conditions are
necessary, if knowledge mobilisation is to work properly. The consistent integration
of the teams into organisational basic structures, ensuring orientation and stability, is
central to the existence of a company culture conducive to knowledge.
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It may be argued that the reorganisation of industrial work (i.e. knowledge
management) in order to mobilise the hitherto hidden competencies in the staff
challenges our traditional understanding of the concept “innovation”. If routine
production is mechanised and (virtually) all employees work creatively, the distinction
between innovative and non innovative activities will be blurred.
Referring to the results of the aforementioned case studies (cf. Hamngren et al.,
1995; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000; Schmierl, 2000) the effective reorganisation strategies
of low-tech companies depend heavily on the utilisation of external conditions and
supportive factors. Establishing relations with other companies, organisations and
institutions is an activity even low-tech industries cannot do without. External
collaboration helps in overcoming the limitations of a firm’s own resources and know-
how in developing new production and innovation potential.
As is the case with a number of branches of industry, vertical co-operation with
suppliers and distributors has also been gaining in importance for low-tech
manufacturers. In many cases relatively loose and order-dependent connections
have been extended and intensified in order to optimise the time for delivery, to
reduce storage costs, and, first and foremost, to test and probe the potential for the
development of the product mix. In order to make co-operation easier, companies
very often set up relations with suppliers in their region, in order to maximise face-to-
face collaboration.
However, it may be assumed that co-operation strategies of companies differ
between countries with specific industrial cultures and traditions. For example, cases
of horizontal co-operation with direct or indirect competitors are rare in Germany.
Though such strategies are not ruled out in principle as interviews with management
representatives showed (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000), compared to eg. the “Third Italy”
or the furniture industry in Flanders (cf. Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; Maskell,
1998) they play a minor role in the actual business. The reasons for such regional
differences will be further analysed in the PILOT project (see below section 5).
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4. Localised industrial creativity – not necessarily high-tech
The strength of Silicon Valley in maintaining its early dominant position in the global
ICT-boom during the 80s and 90s has provided inspiration to analysts and policy
makers as regards the dynamics of high tech clusters and science parks (cf. eg.
Swann et al., 1998). It should be noticed, however, that the dynamics of localised
industries seem to be independent of their R&D intensity. In fact it may be argued
that competitive industrial districts to a large extent develop – or at least have
developed – around LMT industries and technologies. This is the case in, for
example, the furniture industry all over Europe (Lorenzen, 1998; Maskell, 1998;
Jacobson and Mottiar, 1999; Mottiar and Jacobson, 2002), Italian knitwear (Solinas,
1982) and ceramic tiles (Porter, 1990, pp. 210-225) as well as the Swedish Gnosjö
region which is extremely low-tech and has a population with a relatively low level of
education, but is highly entrepreneurial.
The idea that proximity contributes to more rapid development of, and diffusion of,
practical knowledge emanates from the work of Marshall (1890). Among the factors
Marshall identified as “advantages of localisation” was “hereditary skill”. What
Marshall was referring to in this context, was not a genetic inheritance. The reference
is, rather, to a situation in which a large number of people lived and worked – using
similar, specialised skills – in close proximity. The skills in production of the particular
product become so well-known in the area after a generation or two that they
become almost common knowledge in that place; “children learn many of them
unconsciously.” Inventions “and improvements in machinery, in processes and the
general organisation of the business” become quickly known and copied. There is a
milieu that encourages this diffusion. People meet and, through both business and
social interaction, share their knowledge. This is what Krugman (1993) refers to as
technological spillovers, “the more or less pure externality that results from
knowledge spillovers between nearby firms”.
Marshall’s ideas have contributed to the theory of industrial agglomeration (Jacobson
et al., 2002). This is more than just a group of firms in the same place, or a spatial
concentration. What distinguishes an industrial agglomeration from a spatial
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concentration is the presence of agglomeration economies. These are benefits that a
firm derives from the fact that there are other firms located in the same place. They
are a subset of what Marshall (1890) described as external economies. Knowledge
spillovers are an example of this kind of external economy.
Marshall’s work also provided the theoretical basis for the analysis of what has come
to be known as “Third Italian industrial districts”. Emilia-Romagna in Italy has been a
particular focus of attention, because of its ceramic tile, wooden toys, textiles and
clothing, and furniture industrial districts, among others. As can be seen from the
traditional nature of these products, the innovativeness of the LMT industrial districts is
concentrated in their industrial organisation and production processes.
There is a close relationship between the now vast literature on industrial districts –
both in the Third Italy and elsewhere – and work on learning and innovation.
Systems of innovation theories, for example, attributing a critical role to
technological, organisational and institutional learning in the process of innovation,
stress that learning is an interactive and socially embedded process (Lundvall, 1992;
Fischer, 2001). Industrial districts, in which inter-firm co-operation is facilitated by
spatial proximity, provide support for the idea that spatial proximity is important in
promoting interactive learning, innovation and the development of competitive
advantage. Lorenzen (2002) takes this idea further, providing theoretical arguments
for ascribed trust being at the heart of the way in which a kind of shared
understanding develops in networks of firms. Some of this can be codified, especially
in relation to “hard” information such as business data on revenue and profits. This
does not particularly require proximity. In addition, even exchange of “complex, tacit,
and ‘embodied’ information” – though requiring trust, and “frequent face-to-face
interactions”, and though helped to some extent by proximity – is “not severely
inhibited by geographical distance”. However, to derive benefit from high levels of
social trust, sharing in local culture, being part of a community and their rich social
capital, does require close proximity. The ”social learning processes that create
social codebooks ... are constrained by geography”, Lorenzen argues, and ”hence
’cultures’ arise locally – for example in industrial clusters”. All these are highly tacit,
the costs of their development appear nowhere (and certainly not under R&D
expenditure), and yet they contribute substantially to the innovativeness of what
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Lorenzen calls industrial clusters. His contribution to the development of theory in
this area provides a basis for relating the social and cultural to the economic, in a
way particularly relevant to LMT industries.
Organisational proximity is of a non-material and non-market nature (Burmeister and
Colletis-Wahl, 1997, p. 235), and it “presupposes the existence of shared knowledge
and representations of the environment within which the firm exists” (Hudson, 1999,
p. 64). Through interactions in intra-industry relations, co-operation and collective
learning processes, organisational proximity creates a capacity to assemble
fragmented information, tacit knowledge and other non-material and non-
standardised resources. Information originating outside the network is received in a
qualitatively better way, due to organisational proximity among the actors.
Organisational proximity is viewed as a prerequisite for collective learning processes,
and for co-operation among different organisations in the creation of new resources
and innovation. While organisational proximity is a necessary condition for creating
innovations and resources through processes of collective learning, it is also
simultaneously a product of the process of collective learning.
Heanue and Jacobson (2002) provide empirical evidence of organisational proximity
in the case of a dispersed network of three firms in the furniture industry in Ireland.
They show that these firms share values, meanings, understandings and tacit
knowledge and a common set of institutions through which these features are
produced. The most important mediating institution in this case was the Irish
industrial development agency, Enterprise Ireland. The individual involvement of
each of the firms over time in various industry initiatives with Enterprise Ireland not
only contributed to the development of a shared “worldview”, but it also enabled the
firms and institution together to identify suitable partners for the current network.
The empirical focus of this work was a geographically dispersed formal network. In
contrast, Dahl and Pedersen (2003) examine the case of regionally clustered
informal networks. The theoretical context of their work is the recent importance
attached to the role of informal networks in the development of regional clusters. In
particular, informal contact between employees in different firms is argued to be one
of the main carriers of knowledge between firms in a cluster. They empirically
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examine the role of informal contacts in a specific cluster. The analysis, based on a
questionnaire sent to a sample of engineers in a regional cluster of wireless
communication firms in Northern Denmark, shows that the engineers acquire and
share valuable knowledge through informal networks. The authors argue that this
shows that informal contacts are important channels of knowledge diffusion. Again it
must be emphasised that firms gaining from this diffusion of knowledge do so without
any specific R&D effort; in this case the firm gains without any explicit effort at all.
Clustering and knowledge exchange of these types appear to be a pervasive feature
of LMT industries (Isaksen 1998), and it is this that links the innovation and growth
potential of LMT industries to important regional issues in Europe.
5. The future of low-tech sectors
To summarise the preliminary arguments: it appears that the intelligent and
successful production of low-tech products presupposes both a specific practical
knowledge available to companies, and the indirect use of complex knowledge inputs
which are often scientific in character. This view accords with the recent revival of the
debate in the social sciences, dealing with the growing importance of knowledge-
intensive work and the need for organisations to learn and to develop know-how.
These phenomena are generally regarded as characteristics of an emerging
knowledge-oriented society. As emphasised at the beginning of this paper, these
ideas reflect important tendencies of social development. However the activities of
several LMT companies without any doubt fit into this perspective - not only do such
enterprises make intensive use of the knowledge available to them; they also
develop it, restructure their organisations accordingly, innovate and grow.
This means that knowledge and knowledge-based innovation strategies cannot be
regarded as features of expanding and new sectors, such as professional services,
ICT/software or biotech. Without a doubt, these sectors must be regarded as
markedly knowledge-based, since they are immediately dependent on the use of
explicit knowledge. But as the findings presented here suggest, phenomena relevant
to the debate may also be found when one studies other types of knowledge in
industrial core industries – industries that from the point of view of an emerging
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knowledge-based society may seem outdated and far from future-oriented. Such
sectors are not marked by gradual erosion – instead they are repositioning
themselves in the context of socio-economic change. In spite of globalisation and
growing competition, prospects are good in markets for mature products. Partly this
is because the specific practical knowledge low-tech companies are provided cannot
easily be used by potential competitors. For this knowledge, as mentioned above,
can be deeply embedded in the social system of a company and its local
environment, which makes it hardly transferable and accessible to competitors (cf.
Maskell, 1998). This applies – paradoxically – to standardised products which can
considered to be easy to imitate. But such products are often design-intensive, and
have major potential for technological upgrading via the use of complex (often
scientific) knowledge inputs.
These arguments lead to a specific understanding of the restructuring of the
economic landscape of Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. This change
does not appear as a wholesale structural replacement of “old” sectors with “new”
ones, or as substitution of “old” technologies with “new” ones. It evolves as a
restructuring of sectoral and technological systems, transformed more from within
than from without. This change process is not dominated by industrial activities
where competitive advantage, capability formation and economic change are
constituted by frontline technological knowledge. Rather, it is dominated by what are
often wrongly termed low- and medium-tech industries. There are many who argue
that, since high-tech industries and “knowledge-intensive” industries are one and the
same, the economic health of Europe depends simply on the capacity to create and
nurture so-called “high-technology” industries. These industries, particularly the
information technology and telecommunications (ICT) cluster, are regarded as the
bearers of growth, employment and trade success in the future. The policy
conclusion tends to be that innovation policy, technology policy and, indeed,
economic policy more generally ought to be focussed primarily on the creation of ICT
industries.
From the perspective of this paper this type of analysis, and the analytical and policy
conclusions that result, are deeply flawed. The concepts and categories used to
describe allegedly high-tech, knowledge-intensive industries are seriously
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oversimplified, lacking empirical support, and conceptually naive. Rather, we claim
that:
• The innovation systems of Europe and indeed of most industrialised countries are
strongly influenced by low-tech industries.
• The products of these industries are often growing rapidly and in surprising ways,
as a consequence of quality improvements and technological upgrading
• The knowledge bases of these industries are deep, complex and systemic. They
are intensive creators and users of practical knowledge and high-grade design
skills. They use engineering and scientific knowledge and are closely integrated
with the science and technology infrastructure. The mere fact that they do not do
much internal R&D says nothing at all about knowledge intensity or their
contribution to the knowledge economy.
• They are very often embedded in specific regional structures and are part of
regional company networks that differ from country to country and are part of
specific national and regional innovation systems.
Furthermore, the involvement of low-tech products and companies is frequently a
core precondition both for the innovativeness of value chains – or production
systems – and for the design, fabrication and use of a range of high-tech products.
Collaboration and networking between companies of different industries at regional,
national, as well as transnational levels, are increasingly becoming important
determinants of the innovativeness and competitiveness of individual companies.
These value chains, filières or clusters include low-tech companies not just as tiered
participants in supply chains or as more-or-less passive receptors of technologically
advanced machinery and equipment developed independently of user specifications.
On the contrary, the dynamics and efficiency of value chains may be crucially
dependent on the reliability and effectiveness, the capabilities and specific
knowledge of their low-tech partners and on their integration into innovation
processes in other firms in the cluster, whether low-tech or high-tech. It has to be
emphasised that the focus on low-tech firms as parts of wider value chains implies
an immediate inclusion of service functions, whether supplied by independently
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organised service firms, as secondary industrial activities of other firms or through
intra-firm production of ancillary services.
This focus on the contribution of low-tech industries for the innovativeness for
industry in general is extremely important in a policy perspective, both national and
regional innovation policies and for developing a proper foundation for the overall
growth and performance possibilities of the European economy. The development of
the low-tech sectors is of great importance for both ‘old’ industrialised and more
recent ‘high-tech’ economic countries and regions. Following the arguments above,
the high-tech prospects for many economies are based on the presence and
dynamic interaction of reliable „low-tech“ functions and processes. This holds
particularly true for value chains which have an increasingly global character and can
be regarded as one of the driving forces of the economic development. This aspect
is of outstanding importance for the future development of the Central European
countries, since many low-tech processes are located there and they are more and
more integrated into the internationalised value chains. But we are confident in
asserting that the development of Europe as a whole will in future years be based
largely on the competitive and innovative capabilities of the LMT industries discussed
here.
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